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Doctrine: Future Considerations
For Labor and Management
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal and industrial analysts have viewed technological innovation
in the workplace as fundamental to successful competition in the in-
ternational business market.1 As other countries rapidly develop
technologically advanced production methods, the United States is
forced to follow suit.2 Because of the competitive international mar-
ket, robots have been developed which can perform a wide variety of
highly technical and specialized tasks3 - everything from painting
cars to performing human brain surgery.4
As robotics and other forms of automation become more prevalent
in the workplace, analysts are examining the impact of technology on
the human workforce.5 This is due to the fact that "[r]ealistically,
most technological changes are designed to reduce the number of
workers needed to complete a job."6 While the reduction of labor
costs and increases in profits through automation are legitimate man-
agement objectives, automation has caused unemployment and dis-
1. Comment, Automation and the Work Preservation Doctrine: Accommodating
Productivity and Job Security Interests, 32 UCLA L. REv. 135, 135 n.1 (1984).
2. Japan is the most explicit example of economic success through automation
and robotics. Once a nation with a reputation for "flimsy products," Japan is now a
leader in automated industry due to efficiency, high-quality robotics, and technology.
Technology's Impact on the Workforce, HIGH TECH., June 1985, at 4; Competition in
the Japanese Robot Industry, ROBOTICS TODAY, Oct. 1984, at 12. See generally R. PAS-
CALE & A. ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT (1981).
3. Although this comment generally examines recent automation in the form of
robotics and related technology, issues raised and proposals examined are applicable to
all forms of automation.
4. See, e.g., Robots Man The Paint Booth at GM-Orion, ROBOTICS TODAY, Apr.
1985, at 52 (robots used in automobile manufacturing plant); Technology Update:
Brain-Surgeon Robot Passes Test, ROBOTICS TODAY, Apr. 1985, at 16 (robot arm used to
assist in brain surgery).
5. See, e.g., Levitan & Johnson, The Future of Work: Does It Belong to Us or to
the Robots?, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1982, at 10, 11 (discussions and opinions on the
impact of automation and related improvements on human workers).
6. Petrock & Grummon, The Adoption of Technological Change Management Is-
sues and Practices, in 2 ROBOTS 8: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - FUTURE CONSIDERA-
TIONS 15-34, 15-41 (1984) (publication of Robotics International of SME).
placement of workers.7 This situation necessarily creates two
conflicting interests.
The conflict between management's need to automate and remain
economically competitive, and labor's need to preserve work for em-
ployees forms the basis of this comment. This comment examines
each side's arguments and perspectives, analyzes the current law sur-
rounding this issue, and concludes with some suggestions for the res-
olution or abrogation of future problems in this area.
II. THE COMPETING INTERESTS
A. Management Perspectives
Employers favor the implementation of robotics and other technol-
ogy for various reasons. Among the many benefits cited are a proven
quick return on a company's investment, productivity improvement
ranging from twenty to sixty percent, and improved quality of prod-
uct or process output.8 Many United States corporations have recog-
nized the need to automate 9 in order to remain competitive with
offshore producers after the recession years.10 It appears that those
businesses which have automated will be among the most successful
in America.1 While this may appear to paint a rosy picture for fail-
ing industries and a sagging economy, the road to success has been
undermined by controversy and complexity.12 Nevertheless, manage-
ment appears dedicated to making the technological advances re-
7. Tucker, GM: Shifting to Automatic, HIGH TECH., May 1985, at 26.
The average robot in a GM assembly plant displaces at least two workers -
even taking into account the additional employees required to install and
maintain the robots - according to Harly Shaiken, a technology analyst at
MIT. 'Since Hamtramck [GM's newest automated factory] is a new plant,
they won't have many problems with laying people off,' he says. 'But layoffs
will occur in the older Buick, Olds, and Cadillac assembly plants as work is
transferred over to Hamtramck.' In total, Shaiken estimates that at least
40,000 GM jobs will be displaced by automation by the mid-1990's.
Id. at 28.
8. V. Estes, Robot Justification - A Lot More Than Dollars and Cents, 1 ROBOTS
8: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - APPLICATIONS FOR TODAY 2-1, 2-4 (1984).
9. Davis, Renaissance on the Factory Floor, HIGH TECH., May 1985, at 24.
10. Recession years are generally considered to have taken place between 1979 and
1982. During that time the stockmarket was depressed and inflation was rampant.
Companies staggered under the impact of plunging sales levels, low or absent profit
performance, and the loss of hundreds of thousand of jobs. Mittelstadt, Robotics -
Thoughts about the Future, 1 ROBOTS 8: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - APPLICATIONS
FOR TODAY 2-12, 2-14 (1984).
11. See generally Automation US.A., Special Report, HIGH TECH., May 1985, at 24-
47 (articles discuss automation activities of five major U.S. companies and address re-
lated issues).
12. Brody, Overcoming Barriers to Automation, HIGH TECH., May 1985, at 41. This
article cites institutional adversity to change, high cost, complicated and unsuccessful
ventures, and communication problems as examples of barriers to automation. How-
ever, it appears to greatly underestimate the concern shared by most labor organiza-
tions and many workers that automation will eliminate jobs.
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quired to maintain America's international economic success in both
production and process industries, especially in industries where la-
bor costs are high. For example, General Motors expects to invest
over one billion dollars to install approximately 20,000 robots in its
facilities by 1990.13
In unionized manufacturing industries, where wages are inordi-
nately high, robots are even more economically intriguing to employ-
ers. In the automobile industry, for example, a human employee
generally costs an employer between twenty-three and twenty-four
dollars an hour, including benefits, while an industrial robot which
can perform the same job costs approximately six dollars an hour, in-
cluding maintenance costs.14 The economic reorganization of indus-
try in America caused by foreign competition and automation, such
as that taking place at General Motors, has resulted in plant clo-
sures, 15 displacement, and unemployment.16 This is the point at
which the economic rights and interests of management most seri-
ously conflict with the economic rights and interests of labor.
B. Labor Perspectives
"It is beyond question that the United States has always been a 'la-
bor society.' "17 Automation is perceived by many unions and labor-
ers as a serious threat to the status of the worker in society.
Consequently, automation-related issues are rarely favored by un-
ions.' 8 Technological advancement eliminates work in various ways.
While some workers are retrained to perform new work which has
been created by technology, such as maintenance and programming,
authorities contend that the number of new jobs created by technol-
ogy is significantly less than the number of those displaced.19 "Thus,
13. Foulkes & Hirsch, People Make Robots Work, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1984,
at 94, 95.
14. Id.
15. See generally First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). The
Court held that an employer has no duty to discuss or bargain about a decision to close
all or part of a business. The employer's right to make such management decisions was
held to outweigh labor's right to bargain about such events. Id. at 686. See infra notes
93-97 and accompanying text for an examination of the effect of this case on automa-
tion-related decisions.
16. See Foulkes & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 94; Technology's Impact, supra note 2,
at 4.
17. Miller, Were the Luddites Necessarily Wrong?: A Note on the Constitutional-
ity of the "New Technology Bill of Rights," 8 NOVA L.J. 515, 516 (1984).
18. Note, Automation and Collective Bargaining, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1822-23
(1971).
19. Comment, supra note 1, at 136 n.4.
the long-term effect of robotics [and related automation] would be
the unemployment of a large number of unskilled or semi-skilled
workers who literally could not be absorbed into the existing employ-
ment environment primarily because of their lack of technical train-
ing."20 This situation has elicited not just labor union concern, but
the serious concern of both legal scholars and economists. 21 This
concern is justified. "Some researchers estimate that the new gener-
ation of 'smart' robots, equipped with rudimentary vision or tactile
sense, could displace as many as 3.8 million workers."22 Short of dis-
placement, fears have been expressed that automation will result in
highly trained employees being reclassified into lower skilled posi-
tions with a corresponding reduction in wages.23
A case in point involves the members of the International Associa-
tion of Machinists (IAM). Machinists have been displaced by a
number of low-skilled machine operators supported by only a few
highly skilled service employees.24 Unemployment and a lower level
of skills possessed by the average worker have necessarily resulted.
Additionally, the machinists charge the government with com-
pounding this problem by promoting low level vocational training
and encouraging automation without labor's input or repre-
sentation.25
In response to this problem, the IAM has developed a proposed Bill
of Rights that would force management to address technology-related
issues which the IAM claims are being ignored.26 Additionally, un-
20. Comment, Robotics in the Workplace: The Employer's Duty to Bargain Over
its Implementation and Effect on the Worker, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 917, 920-21
(1984). "It is conceivable that blue collar workers in manufacturing could eventually
become as rare as farmworkers." Bargaining for Jobs in the Automated Factory -
Must Managers Consult Labor When Robots Go Marching In?, 4 CAL. LAw. Jan. 1984,
at 28, 31 (quoting AFL-CIO official Dennis Charnot).
21. See generally Symposium: Workers' Rights and the New Technologies, 8 NOVA
L.J. 481 (1984).
22. Foulkes & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 94 (footnote omitted).
23. Note, supra note 18, at 1822-23.
24. See Symposium, supra note 21, at 482-83.
25. Id.
26. Proposed Bill of Rights
Congress hereby amends the National Labor Relations Act, Railway Labor Act,
and other appropriate Acts to declare a national labor policy through a New
Technology Bill of Rights:
I
New Technology shall be used in a way that creates jobs and promotes com-
munity-wide and national full employment.
II
Unit labor cost savings and labor productivity gains resulting from the use
of new technology shall be shared with workers at the local enterprise level
and shall not be permitted to accrue excessively or exclusively for the gain of
capital, management, and shareholders.
Reduced work hours and increased leisure time made possible by new tech-
nology shall result in no loss of real income or decline in living standards for
workers affected at the local enterprise level.
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ions in general promote automation-related issues as subjects of col-
lective bargaining agreements27 and have sought to designate them as
a mandatory subject 2 8 in order to insure that labor's interests and
III
Local communities, the states, and the nation have a right to require em-
ployers to pay a replacement tax on all machinery, equipment, robots, and
production systems that displace workers, cause unemployment and thereby
decrease local, state, and federal revenues.
IV
New Technology shall improve the conditions of work and shall enhance
and expand the opportunities for knowledge, skills and compensation of work-
ers. Displaced workers shall be entitled to training, retraining, and subse-
quent placement or reemployment.
V
New Technology shall be used to develop and strengthen the U.S. industrial
base, consistent with the Full Employment goal and national security require-
ments, before it is licensed or otherwise exported abroad.
VI
New Technology shall be evaluated in terms of worker safety and health
and shall not be destructive of the workplace environment, nor shall it be
used at the expense of the community's natural environment.
VII
Workers, through their trade unions and bargaining units, shall have an ab-
solute right to participate in all phases of management deliberations and deci-
sions that lead or could lead to the introduction of new technology or the
changing of the workplace system design, work processes, and procedures for
doing work, including the shutdown or transfer of work, capital, plant, and
equipment.
VII[sic]
Workers shall have the right to monitor control room centers and control
stations and the new technology shall not be used to monitor, measure or
otherwise control the work practices and work standards of individual work-
ers, at the point of work.
Ix
Storage of an individual worker's personal data and information file by the
employer shall be tightly controlled and the collection and/or release and dis-
semination of information with respect to race, religious, or political activities
and beliefs, records of physical and mental health disorders and treatments,
records of arrests and felony charges or convictions, information concerning
sexual preferences and conduct, information concerning internal and private
family matters, and information regarding an individual's financial condition
or credit worthiness shall not be permitted, except in rare circumstances re-
lated to health, and then only after consultation with a family or union-ap-
pointed physician, psychiatrist, or member of the clergy. The right of an
individual worker to inspect his or her personal data file shall at all times be
absolute and open.
X
When the New Technology is employed in the production of military goods
and services, workers, through their trade union and bargaining agent, have a
right to bargain with management over the establishment of Alternative Pro-
duction Committees, which shall design ways to adopt that technology to so-
cially useful production and products in the civilian sector of the economy.
Symposium, supra note 21, at 483-85.
27. Note, supra note 18, at 1823.
28. Mandatory subjects of bargaining directly or indirectly address wages, hours of
needs are addressed when management is confronted with the deci-
sion to automate.
Union efforts to negotiate automation-related issues with manage-
ment have been stultified by current legal standards regarding sub-
jects of mandatory collective bargaining. 29 Courts and the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have to date been unable to provide
operative guidelines for explaining the extent of the duty to address
automation issues in collective bargaining. Generally, however, man-
agement has not been required to negotiate with unions over such de-
cisions. The rationale for judicial restraint in this area is largely due
to the fact that automation requires major structural changes and ex-
tensive costs which generally fall into the classification of capital im-
provement, an area which management traditionally has the right to
control. The fact that courts recognize management's right to make
such major structural and financial changes without being required
to consult labor, necessarily reduces labor's ability to force input into
automation-related decisions.30
Consequently, where automation threatens to displace workers, la-
bor has turned to negotiating work preservation provisions into col-
lective bargaining agreements. These provisions are called work
preservation clauses31 and have become a major element in many col-
lective bargaining agreements.3 2 Most work preservation clauses con-
tain provisions similar to those found in the IAM's proposed New
Technology Bill of Rights3 3 such as worker participation rights, wage
saving provisions, and retraining for displaced workers.
III. WORK PRESERVATION AND THE LAW
A. NLRA
Under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), cer-
tain types of employee concerted activities are protected. Employees
may engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargain-
work or working conditions. It is an unfair labor practice for either side to refuse to
negotiate over a topic that is classified as a mandatory subject, and it may also be con-
sidered a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
(C. Morris 2d ed. 1983); see also R. ESTES, LABOR RELATIONS HANDBOOK, in INDUS.
REL. GUIDE (P-H) 50,001, 50,455 (1983).
29. Management is not required to bargain over all subjects proposed by the
union. Subjects which are not mandatory are permissive. Parties have complete dis-
cretion to determine whether they wish to address the subjects classified as permissive
during bargaining. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349
(1958). See infra notes 86-99 for a discussion of the duty to bargain.
30. Comment, supra note 1, at 136-38. See also Leap & Barrilleaux Pizzolaho,
Robotics Technology: the Implications for Collective Bargaining and Labor Law, 34
LAB. L.J. 697, 697-703 (1983).
31. Comment, supra note 1, at 139.
32. Id. at 139 n.17.
33. See supra note 26.
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ing or other mutual aid or protection.34 This provision includes law-
ful activities calculated to improve or protect wages, hours, and
working conditions. Work preservation activity has been held to be
an activity relating to working conditions and, as such, has been con-
sidered a concerted activity. 35
While concerted activity to preserve work is arguably protected, a
problem arises when such activities interfere with the rights of a
neutral third party. This is because section 8 of the NLRA prohibits
secondary activity,36 which is activity that attempts to reach out and
affect the rights of a third party and is "calculated to satisfy union
objectives elsewhere." 37 Most work preservation efforts include both
primary and secondary activity.38 This is due to the fact that
although the activity primarily concerns preserving the work of a
particular unit, the employer may be required, under a work preser-
vation or work allocation clause, to return previously subcontracted
or transferred work to the original bargaining unit.3 9
It has been argued that work preservation activities involve differ-
ent goals than those Congress intended to prohibit by the enactment
of section 8's prohibition against secondary activity.40 Regardless of
the union's work preservation legitimacy, courts and the NLRB origi-
nally applied a "cease doing business" analysis 41 to work preservation
clauses based on an as-applied factual examination.42 This resulted
in confusion among the courts and the NLRB and the lack of a per se
34. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Concerted activity consists of employees acting in a
group to protect collectively bargained or statutory rights. See also, INDUS. REL. GUIDE
(P-H) supra note 28, at 50,661.
35. See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1964) (citing
Pub. L. Ch. 120 8(d), 61 stat. 142 (1947)) (held that subcontracting work previously
performed by unit members was a condition of employment).
36. While primary activity affects employer-employee relationships directly within
the bargaining unit, secondary activity, in the form of sympathy strikes, coercive bar-
gaining, and walk-outs may extend well beyond the unit. Because of the obvious
problems such activities have the potential to cause, secondary activities are prohibited
by the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1982).
37. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 644 (1967).
38. Comment, supra note 1, at 142.
39. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 710 (Wilson & Co.), 335 F.2d 709, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
40. Comment, supra note 1, at 143-44. See also Cassman, Deconsolidating the
Work Preservation Doctrine: Dolphin-Associated Transport, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 604,
607 (1981) (application of secondary boycott analysis to work preservation cases was ar-
guably not what Congress contemplated or intended).
41. The "cease doing business" analysis evolved from the terminology used in sec-
tion 8(e) of the NLRA. Section 8(e) expressly prohibits agreements to "cease doing
business" with third parties caused by union pressure.
42. See, e.g., Meat and Highway Drivers, Local No. 710 (Wilson & Co.), 143
N.L.R.B. 1221, 1229-30 (1963), modified, 335 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (union could not
rule applicable to work preservation cases. As work preservation is-
sues became more prevalent in labor management litigation, the
courts and the NLRB began to develop case law which expressly ad-
dressed work preservation issues.
B. Work Preservation Case Law
The Supreme Court first addressed the work preservation issue in
National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB.43 The
union had negotiated a work preservation clause which precluded the
employer from using new products that would displace jobs.44 The
Court was concerned with the protection and preservation of work
customarily performed by employees within the bargaining unit.
This form of preservation was considered to be primary and there-
fore lawful under section 8(e) of the NLRA.45 Consequently, the
Court formulated the work preservation doctrine.46 The work pres-
ervation doctrine allows unions to negotiate clauses which preserve
work even though the rights of the third party are affected, as long
as the primary purpose of the clause is to preserve work for employ-
ees within the bargaining unit.47 The purpose of this doctrine was to
clarify the legality of work preservation clauses by distinguishing be-
tween primary activity attempting to protect unit jobs and secondary
activity which sought to achieve objectives relating to the boycotted
third party employer.48
The Court held that a union could negotiate a work preservation
clause without violating section 8(b)(4)(B) or 8(e)'s prohibitions
against secondary boycott activities as long as the objective of the
clause was to address "labor relations of the contracting employer
vis-a-vis his own employees."49 The Court then adopted the "tradi-
tional work" standard similar to that which had previously been used
reclaim work because it had already been transferred to a third-party business and this
would require the employer to cease doing business with the third party).
43. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
44. Id. at 616. This clause contained a provision which union members used as au-
thorization for refusing to handle prefabricated doors. The door manufacturer, whose
contract had been cancelled as a result of the work preservation clause, sued, arguing
that the clause was in violation of section 8(e). Id. Section 8(e) is the counterpart to
section 8(b)(4)(B)'s secondary boycott provisions. A "hot cargo" clause, which consists
of an agreement between the union and a third party-employer to cause directly or in-
directly a secondary boycott, is prohibited by section 8(e). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982).
45. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 637-38 (1967).
46. Note that although the Supreme Court did not expressly formulate the work
preservation doctrine until it decided NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
447 U.S. 490 (1980), the Court intimated that such a standard was available by the pri-
mary-secondary analysis espoused in National Woodwork. See generally National
Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 620-39.
47. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 1214 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
48. Id. at 1215 (quoting National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 644-45).
49. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 645 (footnote omitted).
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by the NLRB.50 The "traditional tasks" analysis was adopted because
the Court found that the Union's efforts to preserve work were "re-
lated solely to preservation of the traditional tasks of the jobsite
carpenters."51
Although the Court noted that under the secondary-primary analy-
sis these standards would "not always be a simple test to apply,"52 it
declined to elaborate on how courts could consistently determine
when clauses were sufficiently primary to withstand the section 8
prohibitions.5 3 Nonetheless, the primary-secondary traditional work
standard espoused in National Woodwork became the basis upon
which subsequent courts attempted to differentiate between lawful
work preservation activity and illegal work acquisition. 54
The Court in National Woodwork acknowledged that "[iln this era
of automation and onrushing technological change no problems in
the domestic economy are of greater concern than those involving job
security and employment stability."5 5 In view of this, the Court chas-
tized Congress for failing to adequately assess the consequences of
precluding labor-management collective negotiations in the area of
technology related work preservation. 56
The Court in National Woodwork did, however, limit its holding to
union responses designed to protect that particular union's future job
displacement by limiting or controlling the implementation of tech-
nological improvements or expansions.5 7 As technology advances in
50. Id. at 646. See, e.g., Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Union No. 546, 133
N.L.R.B. 1314, 1316 (1961), enforced sub nom., Minnesota Milk Co. v. NLRB, 314 F.2d
761 (8th Cir. 1963) (NLRB examination of traditional work in the area of sub-
contracting).
51. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 644-46.
52. Id. at 645. The Court did, however, put forward a comparison of the National
Woodwork facts, found to be primary, and the facts in a previous case, Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), held to be secondary and unlawful. The
Court in National Woodwork found that while the Carpenters and Joiners Union in
the National Woodwork case had confined their activities to preserving work within
their own bargaining unit, "the boycott in Allen Bradley was carried on, not as a shield
to protect or preserve the jobs of Local 3 members, traditionally a primary labor activ-
ity, but as a sword to reach out and monopolize all the manufacturing job tasks for
Local 3 members." National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 630.
53. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 644 (the existence of a violation cannot be de-
termined without an inquiry into the surrounding circumstances).
54. See LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS § 1.02[2] (J. Moss ed. 1986); Comment, supra
note 1, at 152-53.
55. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 640 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 225 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
56. Id. at 640-42.
57. See id. at 631-32.
a variety of work displacing methods, unions are forced to take dif-
ferent types of work preservation action than that addressed in Na-
tional Woodwork. Consequently, the work preservation doctrine, as
established by National Woodwork, has been criticized as being inap-
plicable to recent forms of labor work preservation action.58 This is
because technology has significantly reformed production and
processing systems and the new work created by technology is no
longer sufficiently analogous to the work displaced by such technol-
ogy. These new forms of work cannot easily be applied to the vague
traditional-primary analysis espoused in National Woodwork.
Containerization of the shipping industry presents an example of
the legal conflict created by the decreasing feasibility of the tradi-
tional work preservation doctrine.59 The use of containers to trans-
port and move cargo directly from trucks to ships, and vice versa,
drastically reduced the amount of traditional work available to long-
shoremen at every major port in the country.60 The problem was
further complicated when shipping lines began contracting directly
with freight consolidators.61 This caused the loading and unloading
of containers to be done away from the piers.62
Faced with significant potential for displacement, even possible ex-
tinction, the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) re-
sponded to containerization by collectively negotiating its Rules on
Containers into the labor-management agreement.63 As a result of
enforcement of these Rules, the off-pier companies which had re-
placed the longshoremen in the task of loading and unloading the
containers, filed an unfair labor practice grievance with the NLRB
alleging that the Rules on Containers violated sections 8(b)(4)(B) and
8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act.64
58. See generally Cassman, supra note 40.
59. See Ross, Waterfront Labor Response to Technological Change: A Tale of Two
Unions, 21 LAB. L.J. 397 (1970).
60. See id.
61. Freight Consolidators usually have their own off-pier terminals at which they
combine the goods received from various shippers. Goods are then transported by
truckers or shipping lines to their ultimate destination. NLRB v. Longshoremen, 447
U.S. 490, 496 n.8 (1980). See also Comment, Intermodal Transportation and the Freight
Forwarder, 76 YALE L.J. 1360, 1362 (1967).
62. See, e.g., NLRB v. Longshoremen, 447 U.S. 490, 495-96 (1980).
63. The Rules on Containers gave longshoremen the exclusive right to load and
unload containers which had been consolidated locally, within a fifty mile radius of the
pier. Additionally, the shippers who violated the Rules were required to pay the union
liquidated damages. The off-pier warehouse and trucking consolidators who lost work
as a result of the enforcement of the Rules filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the NLRB claiming that the Rules contained illegal secondary objectives. See id. at
500-02. For a more detailed explanation of the facts from which the container contro-
versy arose, see Cassman, supra note 40, at 621-31.
64. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 221 N.L.R.B. 956 (1975), enforced, 537
F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
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In International Longshoremen's Association (Consolidated Ex-
press, Inc.), 65 the NLRB declined to expand its interpretation of the
work preservation doctrine to include the container situation. In
making this decision, the Board applied a very limited reading of the
National Woodwork work preservation doctrine. The Board held
that the Rules on Containers included provisions for acquiring work
which had not been within the longshoremen's traditional work juris-
diction.66 Therefore, the Board found that the Rules were in viola-
tion of the secondary boycott provisions contained in the NLRA.
This issue ultimately reached the Supreme Court in International
Longshoremen's Association v. NLRB (ILA 1),67 where the Court held
that the Rules on Containers constituted lawful, primary work pres-
ervation activity.6 8 The Court explicity expanded its work preserva-
tion analysis to include a "functional equivalent" element.6 9 This
element takes into account the necessary relationship between tradi-
tional unit work and the related work that emerges as technological
advances are made. The Court stated that the legality of these new
work preservation agreements "turns, as an initial matter, on
whether the historical and functional relationship between this re-
tained work and traditional longshore work can support the conclu-
sion that the objective of the agreement was work preservation
rather than the satisfaction of union goals elsewhere."70
After expanding the work preservation doctrine and noting that
the NLRB had erred as a matter of law, the Court remanded ILA I to
the NLRB to determine "whether the Rules represent[ed] a lawful
attempt to preserve traditional longshore work, or whether, instead,
they [were] 'tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives else-
where[.]' "71 Although the new "functionally related work" standard
increased the flexibility of the NLRB and the courts to accommodate
work alterations in jobs caused by new technology, the Court failed
to provide adequate guidelines for determining what types of work
were in fact functionally related.72
65. Id.
66. Id. at 712.
67. 447 U.S. 490 (1980). This case was a consolidation of two NLRB containeriza-
tion cases. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Dolphin Forwarding, Inc.), 236
N.L.R.B. 525 (1978); International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Associated Transp. Inc.), 231
N.L.R.B. 351 (1977).
68. ILA 1, 447 U.S. at 506-10.
69. Id. at 510.
70. Id. (footnote omitted).
71. Id. at 511 (quoting National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 644).
72. ILA 1, 447 U.S. at 511-12; see also Comment, supra note 1, at 157-58.
Despite the implications by the Court, in dictum, that the Rules on
Containers were lawful under its expanded version of the work pres-
ervation doctrine, the NLRB went on to hold that the Rules con-
tained an unlawful secondary work acquisition objective.7 3 The
Board found that the employer had not diverted work from long-
shoremen to third parties, but that containerization had simply elimi-
nated their jobs. 74
The Board's decision was reversed, in part, on appeal75 and the
work preservation issue appeared again on the Supreme Court's
docket in International Longshoremen's Association v. NLRB (ILA
I!).76 This time the Court found that the Board's partial invalidation
of the rules was inconsistent with the Court's decisions in National
Woodwork and ILA L77
In affirming the appellate court's reversal of the Board's decision,
the Court noted that the Board had committed two fundamental er-
rors in its attempt to analyze the Rules on Containers. 78 First, the
Court stated that by focusing on the effect the Rules may have had
on truckers and warehousers, the Board contravened the Court's di-
rection that such "extra-unit effects" were irrelevant.79 Second, the
Court said the Board "misconstrued" previous Supreme Court cases
by "suggesting that eliminated work can never be the object of a
work preservation agreement."8 0
The Court then returned to the broad primary-secondary test es-
tablished in National Woodwork.81 It held that this test was still the
relevant inquiry for examining whether a union's work preservation
efforts violate sections 8(b)(4)(B) or 8(e) of the NLRA. Although the
Court admitted that this "inquiry is often an inferential and fact-
based one, at times requiring the drawing of lines 'more nice than ob-
73. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 266 N.L.R.B. 230 (1983) (this case was a
consolidation of nine ILA Container Rules Cases which were before the Board). See
NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. 3045, 3050 n.6 (1985) [herein-
after cited as ILA I].
74. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 266 N.L.R.B. at 237.
75. American Trucking Ass'ns v. NLRB, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2311 (4th Cir. 1984).
76. 105 S. Ct. 3045 (1985) (the Court limited its inquiry to the alleged unlawfulness
of the Rules with regard to the truckers and warehousers classes of jobs which the
Rules were alleged to have illegally acquired for ILA members).
77. Id. at 3047.
78. Id. at 3056.
79. Id. See also ILA I, 447 U.S. at 507 n.22; NLRB v. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 526
n.13 (1977) (listing cases in which the National Woodwork rule had been consistently
applied).
80. ILA II, 105 S. Ct. at 3056. " 'Elimination' of work in the sense that is made
unnecessary by innovation is not of itself a reason to condemn work-preservation
agreements under 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e); to the contrary, such elimination provides the
very premise for such agreements." Id. at 3057.
81. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
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vious,' "82 it declined to provide more specific guidelines. While it
recognized that arguments against work preservation may have some
validity, the Court stated that Congress was the proper branch of
government to address those arguments.8 3 Thus, though the Court's
decision in ILA I expressed genuine concern for labor's right to col-
lectively bargain effective work preservation clauses and for manage-
ment's right to prevent secondary boycotts, the Court once again left
the NLRB and lower courts in the dark concerning how work preser-
vation and secondary boycott rights are to be effectively co-analyzed.
Although the container automation issues first surfaced in the late
1950's, the Court's ultimate resolution occurred over twenty years
later. As technology related displacement becomes more prevalent,
work preservation-automation related issues in a variety of factual
formats will again haunt the Court. Each time a worker is displaced
by automation or an unlawful secondary provision is negotiated into
a collective bargaining agreement under the guise of work preserva-
tion, the parties to this conflict will recognize the need for more pre-
cise guidelines from either Congress or the Court. Until such
guidelines are provided, labor-automation law, like automation itself,
will continue to be devoid of a reasonably predictable future. Never-
theless, the issue will continue to be a "'hotly disputed topic of col-
lective bargaining.' "84
C. Duty to Bargain Over Automation
Subject to the provisions of section 9(a), section 8(a)(5)85 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act requires employers to bargain collectively
"in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of employment."86 Additionally, section 158(d) requires that
bargaining be in "good faith" and goes on to define required bargain-
ing areas as those concerning "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment."87
82. ILA II, 105 S. Ct. at 3057 (quoting Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667,
674 (1961)).
83. ILA II, 105 S. Ct. at 3057-58.
84. Id. at 3048 (quoting ILA 1, 447 U.S. at 496).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 158(1), (5) (1983).
86. Section 159(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[r]epresentatives designated or
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining... shall be the exclusive representa-
tives . . .for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment .... 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a)(1983).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1983).
From these statutory provisions the NLRB has established two dis-
tinct classes of bargaining areas. One class includes mandatory topics
over which the parties are required to bargain, the other class con-
tains subjects which, although lawful subjects, are not required to be
discussed.88 Consequently, the ability of management to legally ex-
clude union influence from automation-related decisions is dependent
upon whether such decisions are mandatory bargaining subjects.
The NLRB decisions and case law in this area are somewhat vague.
The NLRB has generally held that an employer has a mandatory
duty to bargain over the decision to automate.89 However, the courts,
while recognizing that the decision to automate is a mandatory sub-
ject,90 have generally exempted decisions concerning fundamental
business operations from the mandatory classification. The rationale
for this position is that these decisions are economically motivated,
and, as such, should remain under management control.91 These ex-
emptions, however, have not been adequately defined, and this has
resulted in ad hoc balancing of management and labor interests.
Such balancing produces decisions which reflect subjective views
about the legitimacy of labor objectives92 and, in turn, provide no uni-
laterally applicable standard.
In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,9s the Supreme
Court addressed the scope of management's duty to bargain over par-
tial business closures. The Court held that because partial closings
were within the category of managerial decisions which are economi-
cally motivated, an employer has no duty to bargain about its deci-
sion to close part of its business.94 The rationale for this holding was
that while both parties possess significant interests in the decision to
88. See supra notes 27 and 28 for more detailed mandatory-permissive explana-
tion. Note also that there is a third, but significantly less controversial, category which
contains illegal subjects. Neither side is allowed to discuss illegal subjects. See gener-
ally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 863-69 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
89. See, e.g., Plymouth Locomotive Works, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 595, 602 (1982); John
Hutton Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 85 (1974); Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294, 1297
(1962).
90. See, e.g., Newspaper Printing Corp. v. NLRB, 625 F.2d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 1980)
(automation of newspaper industry held a mandatory bargaining subject).
91. See, e.g., NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1970) (decision to
close subsidiary for economic reasons was not an unfair labor practice); NLRB v. Royal
Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1965) (decision to close smaller plant
due to unprofitability not an unfair labor practice).
92. Comment, supra note 1, at 171 (citing First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
452 U.S. 666 (1981) and NLRB v. Island Typographers, 705 F.2d 44, 50 n.8 (2d Cir.
1983)).
93. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
94. Id. at 686. The Court did, however, expressly decline to address the applica-
tion of First National Maintenance "to other types of management decisions, such as
plant relocations, sales, other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be
considered on their particular facts." Id. at 686 n.22. See infra notes 97-99 and accom-
panying text.
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close, the employer's need to manage business interests outweighs
any potential benefit to the union through collective bargaining.95
"The First National Maintenance opinion created a presumption in
favor of an employer's right to operate its enterprise freely, which
could be rebutted only by an offsetting benefit to harmonious labor
relations."96 However, the Court explicitly declined to determine
whether this balance was applicable to automation-related deci-
sions.97 In a subsequent decision by the Second Circuit, this issue
was decided in the affirmative, and an automation-related decision
was held to be subject to the criterion espoused in First National
Maintenance.98
The holding in First National Maintenance will enable manage-
ment to claim that the decision to automate is analogous to a partial
closing and, as such, is not a mandatory bargaining item. Because the
Court in First National Maintenance has placed a higher value on
managerial rights and a free enterprise economy, the rights of em-
ployers may be afforded greater weight than the rights of labor.99
Technology-related business literature emphatically disagrees with
the presumption that labor's interests do not equal management's in
this area. The literature consistently cites the need for labor-man-
agement cooperation to insure the success of major automation un-
dertakings. The future of a successful step into the automation age
largely depends upon the successful integration of labor's input into
automation-related projects. 100
IV. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
Different studies on the effects of automation and robotics have
95. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 678-79. The Court found that such a
decision would be mandatory only where management and labor would benefit
equally. The Court then formulated a test for weighing the interests:
[I]n view of an employer's need for unencumbered decision-making, bargain-
ing over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the contin-
ued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for
labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs
the burden placed on the conduct of the business.
Id. at 679.
96. Comment, supra note 1, at 172.
97. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 686 n.22.
98. NLRB v. Island Typographers, 705 F.2d 44, 50 n.8 (2d Cir. 1983) (automation-
related decision to replace type forming in newspaper business would ordinarily be
subject to the test of First National Maintenance).
99. Comment, supra note 1, at 172-73.
100. See, e.g., Daily Labor Report, Sept. 15, 1986 D-1 full text section.
reached varying results. One thing that can be agreed upon, how-
ever, is that a substantial number of American workers will be dis-
placed by robots and other forms of automation as the country steps
into what is being called an era of automation. This era has been re-
garded as "one which would rival or surpass the Industrial Revolu-
tion of the 19th century in importance."11
Technical advances in agriculture, printing, and mining, for exam-
ple, have displaced thousands of workers.102 From 1949 to 1981, the
proportion of production workers to the total employed population
declined from 82% to 71% and continues to decline.103 This is leading
to a long term shift in employment from the industrial blue-collar
sector to the service sector. The problem, however, is the inability of
the services sector to adequately absorb sufficient amounts of dis-
placed workers. As automation research analyst Harley Shaiken has
stated: "This technology affects offices as well as factories. It creates
a potential economic vise. One jaw shoves people from the plant, and
the other limits their shift to white-collar jobs."104
This situation leaves management in a practical dilemma. While
management appears to have the right to integrate automation into
their manufacturing systems without mandatory and potentially
costly labor input, many successful companies cite labor's input as a
prerequisite for significant technological achievements.O5
The agreements made by the auto industries in America are de-
monstrative of the benefits to be derived from management commu-
nicating with labor during automation integration. 06 In the auto
industry such worker participation and communication, although
complicated by long standing obstacles such as labor-management an-
tagonism, has been considered a significant element leading to overall
plant efficiency and success. 107
101. Levitan & Johnson, supra note 5, at 10.
102. Katzman, When Robots Dominate the U.S. Workplace, SUPERVISORY MGMT.,
June 1983, at 39.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 40.
105. Katz, SMR Forum: Assessing the New Auto Labor Agreements, SLOAN MGMT.
REV., Summer 1982, at 60 [hereinafter cited as Katz]. See also, Foulkes & Hirsch,
supra note 13, at 94; Altmuro, How to Achieve Employee Support, Safety and Success
in Your First Robot Installation, in 2 ROBOTS 8: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - FUTURE
CONSIDERATIONS, 15-1 to 15-8 (1984); Anderson & Gartner, When Robots and People
Work Together, in 2 ROBOTS 8: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - FUTURE CONSIDERA-
TIONS, 15-22 to 15-33 (1984).
106. See, e.g., Guest, Quality of Worklife - Learning From Tarrytown, HARV. Bus.
REV., July-Aug. 1979, at 76. (unsuccessful plant with a very poor labor management
relations record was turned around by a Quality of Work Life (QWL) program instal-
lation which included, among other things, labor's input into operations management);
see generally Comment, supra note 1, at 174-76 (citing Guest, supra note 106, and other
authority to support this general communications-related proposition).
107. Guest, supra note 106, at 85-87.
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Before introducing robots into a production system, management
should carefully analyze the effects they will have on the workplace,
principally on employee displacement. Management should try to
avoid displacement by retraining as many workers as possible for
other jobs within the company. This promotes trust and confidence
in automation rather than an antagonistic, negative attitude toward
management. 0 8 For those who are unavoidably displaced, manage-
ment can help make the adjustment easier by communicating the dis-
placement factor to the workers well in advance of the actual event.
This allows employees more time to find alternative employment.
This discussion of workers' problems and management solutions is
by no means exhaustive. It is merely an attempt to illustrate the di-
lemma facing U.S. industry. Robots, which can be advantageous for
business, have the potential to be disastrous for workers. It is neces-
sary for business to take advantage of the new technologies and re-
main competitive overseas but it is equally necessary for them to
responsibly consider the potentially adverse effects of this transition.
While some legal commentators see the expansion of the work
preservation doctrine as the answer to this problem,109 others view
rejection of the doctrine as the proper methodilo of starting down the
long, complex road to successful resolution of this conflict.
Regardless of the approach taken, this issue will not go away and it
"merits serious discussion.""'1 As manufacturing companies continue
to undertake major technological advances in the form of robotics
and other automation, the legal community must become more re-
sponsive to both sides of this conflict. No longer will ambiguous or
"nice" distinctions suffice.
V. CONCLUSION
To date, the courts and the NLRB have provided only vague stan-
dards for the application of the work preservation doctrine. As such,
more definitive guidelines are needed in order to avoid unnecessary
litigation and frustration. Once legal parameters are established, la-
bor and management must work together to seek a mutually accepta-
108. See supra note 95 for this and other successful integration suggestions. See
also Daily Labor Report, supra note 100.
109. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 1, at 162-76 (author advocating expansion of the
work preservation doctrine).
110. See, e.g., Cassman, supra note 40, at 631-35 (author advocates rejection of doc-
trine because, he argues, it is based upon erroneous distinctions).
111. Id. at 635.
ble solution to this problem before technological advances complicate
the situation to the point where no amicable resolution is possible.
This, like most other labor-management negotiations, will necessarily
involve concessions by both sides. These suggestions serve to pro-
mote a less controversial, more successful transition into the oncom-
ing automation era.
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